Kreeka/Euroopa probleemidest ja Eesti konservatiivsest eelarvepoliitikast
Lõuna-Euroopa riikide vastutustundetu laenamine mugavama elu nimel on vallandamas kriisi, mida keegi Euroopas näha ei soovi. Kes teema vastu huvi tunneb, siis see on tõenäoliselt leidnud artikleid suurematest väljaannetest. Artiklid New York Times’is:
“It is a problem,” said Alessandro Leipold, a former acting director of the I.M.F.’s European department. “It should not be that difficult — they did it in Hungary and Latvia. But the egos are different in industrialized countries.”
A case can be made that if Greece had sought help from the fund late last year after the forecast for its budget deficit doubled, the amount of support needed to reassure investors would have been much less than the 120 billion euros that even now might not be enough.
With direct comparisons being drawn with the panic prompted by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, European leaders promised to provide tens of billions of euros to Athens within the next three weeks. But Germany was still insisting on tougher economic reforms from Greece before approving a €100bn-€120bn (£89bn-£104bn) joint EU bailout, leading to fresh turbulence on Europe’s financial markets.
Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, promised swift action to end the crisis, but said it was a mistake for Greece to have been allowed to join the single currency. “In 2000 we had a situation when we were confronted with the question of whether Greece should be able to join the eurozone,” she said. “It turned out that the decision [in favour] may not have been scrutinised closely enough.”
Eurozone and IMF negotiators have held 10 days of discussions in Athens and are pressing the Greek authorities to commit to an even more far-reaching austerity programme than was deemed necessary by eurozone authorities in January.
Eurozone officials said the talks in Athens had steered well clear of a subject that is weighing heavily on financial markets: whether Greece will have to restructure its debts, inflicting severe losses on holders of Greek government bonds.
Economists said the eurozone and IMF negotiators appeared unwilling to broach the idea of a Greek debt restructuring for fear of causing mayhem in international bond markets.
annavad toimuvas igati asjaliku ülevaate, mida vürtsitavad Edward Hugh tagasihoidliku hoiatusega, et lõunas toimuv võib elu oluliselt keerulisemaks ka idas teha.
Baseline Scenario tundus olevat üks esimesi, kes juba kuu alguses ennustas, et Brüsseli koridorides sosistatud summad olid tõenäoliselt kordades väiksemad sellest, mida tegelikult vaja läheb. Tänase seisuga tundub nende ennustus peaaegu konservatiivne. Eilses postituses lahati aga kõige tõenäolisemat stsenaariumi, mis tundub esialgu natuke liiga pessimistlik:
If this awful but unfortunately plausible scenario comes about, there is a clear solution – unfortunately, it is also anathema to Mr. Trichet and Ms. Merkel, and thus unlikely to be discussed seriously until it is too late. This is the standard package that comes to all emerging markets in crisis: a very sharp fall in the euro, restructuring of euro zone fiscal/monetary rules to make them compatible with financial stability, and massive external liquidity support – not because Europe has an external payments problem, but because this is the only way to provide credible budget support that softens the blow of the needed austerity programs.
The liquidity support involved would be large: if we assume that roughly three years of sovereign debt repayments should be fully backed – and it takes that kind of commitment to break such negative sentiment – then approximately $1 trillion would be needed to backstop Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy. It may be that more funds are eventually needed – but in any case, the amounts would be less than the total reserves of China. These amounts would also be reduced as the euro falls; it could be heading back to well under $1 per euro, which is where it stood one decade ago.
The American Interest on avaldanud Walter Russell Mead’i mõtiskluse, mis käsitleb pigem poliitilisi kui majanduslike küsimusi ja toob välja ühe huvitava seiga:
It is tempting and superficially agreeable for Americans to gloat about Europe’s troubles. After all, every time something goes wrong in American domestic or economic policy, European elites and journalists are quick to gloat and find fault. After listening to two years of stern and self righteous lectures about the ‘failure’ of the American capitalist model, many Americans who deal with the Europeans are quietly enjoying the spectacle of the smug Europeans writhing in helpless indecision and pain over the continent’s self-inflicted wounds.
But bad news for the EU is bad news for us too. Irritating as a strong EU can be, a weak and divided Europe is much worse. A peaceful, prosperous and geopolitically boring continent that exports tedious platitudes about global governance is a far better place than any other Europe we have seen in modern times and American national interests are in no way enhanced by economic and political instability in the Mediterranean — to say nothing of Ukraine and Turkey.
Praegust olukorda vaadates tekib tahes tahtmata küsimus, et mida peaks nendest inimestest arvama, kes soovitasid veel üpris hiljuti Eestil võlakirjasid väljastada (mitte, et Vitsur ise varem sama poleks soovinud) või osade erakondade soovist lõppenud buumi tippajal kulutusi kasvatada tempos, mis oleks tähendanud võlakirjad väljastamist? Mis intressile peaks Eesti praegu rahaturgudel otsa vaatama kui nii oleks läinud ja kui suur oleks riigivõlg tervikuna? Mulle tundub, et kui nii oleks läinud, siis oleks meie praegune majandusseis tundunud lausa ahvatlev.
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