Ilustamata karget lugemist eurolala väljavaadetest
Peter Boone ja Simon Johnson ei hoia ennast värskes euroala väljavaadete analüüsis The European Crisis Deepens (pdf) tagasi ega vaevu enda sõnumit isegi mitte eriti ilustama:
At the least, we expect several more sovereign defaults and multiple further crises to plague Europe in the next several years. There is simply too much debt, and adjustment programs are too slow to prevent it. But this prediction implies that the long-term social costs, including unemployment and reces- sions rather than growth, attributable to this currency union are serious. Sometimes it is easier to make these adjustments through flexible exchange rates, and we certainly would have seen more rapid recovery if peripheral nations had the leeway to use exchange rates.
When we combine multiple years of stagnation with leveraged financial institutions and nervous financial markets, a rapid shift from low-level crisis to collapse is very plausible. European leaders could take measures to reduce this risk (through further actions on sovereign debt restructurings, more aggressive economic adjustment, and increased bailout funds). However, so far, there is little political will to take these necessary measures. Europe’s economy remains, therefore, in a dangerous state.
Kuigi pikkust on kirjutisel oma 13 lehekülge, siis umbes veerandi sellest moodustavad erinevad joonised, mis annavad ka ilma teksti lugemata päris selgelt mõista, et probleemid on arvestatavad ning tegelikult pole jõutud isegi mitte nende lahendamise alguseni. Vast kõige masendavam on joonis nr. 6, mis vaatleb usaldusväärsuse tagamiseks vajalike summasid nelja erineva stsenaariumi puhul. Masendavaks teeb aga selle joonise eelkõige tõsiasi, et alles 2010. aasta aprilli lõpus olid Boone ja Johnson arvamusel, et triljonist eurost võiks stabiilsuse tagamiseks ja turgude rahustamiseks piisada, kuid praegu on isegi kõige positiivsema stsenaariumi puhul juttu ligi 2,5-st triljonist eurost ning märksa tõenäolisem on stsenaarium, kus vaja läheks vähemalt 3,5 triljonit eurot.
Paljuski samal teemal ning kasutades Boone’i ja Johnsoni eelnevalt viidatud ülevaatest laenatud jooniseid, kirjutab John Maudlin mõnevõrra laiemalt ja ilmselt ka kaasahaaravamalt rahaliidu välja vaadetest ja põhiprobleemidest essees Staring into The Abyss:
Europe has three main problems.
1. A growing number of its countries are insolvent or close to it. It is increasingly likely that the only way forward is for defaults of some type, to lessen the burden of debt to a level where it can be dealt with and that will allow the countries the possibility of growth, which is the only real answer to the problems they face.
2. Because of growing fears of multiple defaults (just Greece would be bad enough!) most of the banks in Europe are seen to be insolvent and in need of hundreds of billions of euros of new capital. The interbank market in Europe is in a shambles, and banks park their cash with the ECB, at a lower rate of return, as that is the only institution they trust. They clearly do not trust each other. As an aside, I heard from many sources while I was Hong Kong and Singapore, meeting with readers and friends, that European banks (especially French) are cutting back on their trade lending, which is making normal commerce more difficult. Didn’t we just go through that in 2008?
3. The real problem in Europe is the massive trade imbalances between the peripheral countries and the so-called core countries. Without the ability to adjust currencies, those trade imbalances will render any debt solution moot, as a country cannot balance its budget while it runs a trade deficit and its citizens and businesses also deleverage. I have written about this arithmetic problem on numerous occasions. There must be balance or there must be a mechanism to achieve balance.
One cannot solve one problem without solving all three. Either they all get done or none truly get done. You can kick the can down the road by solving problems 1 and 2, but problem 3 will put you shortly back to square one.
Maudlin’i essee väärib tähelepanu eelkõige sellepärast, et tegu on investoriga, kellel enda (ja klientide) raha mängus ja kes on sunnitud otsuseid tegema lähtuvalt sellest, kuidas tema olukorda tajub ja mida tõenäoliseks peab. Soovunelmate, optimistlike stsenaariumite ja teoreetiliste lahendustega pole tal midagi peale hakata. Tema soovitused/tõdemused on välja toodud essee lõpus, kus ta on muu hulgas maha kandnud nii Kreeka kui Portugali ning veendunud, et iirlased pankade võlgasid tegelikult katta ei kavatse. Mida ta Itaaliast, Hispaaniast ja Prantsusmaast arvab leiab aga siit.
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